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STRATEGIC THINKING ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICAN ZONING
I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay arises out of my experience participating in New York Law School’s
unique seminar on Race, Bias, and Advocacy described in Professor Edward A.
Purcell, Jr.,’s introductory essay.1 In that piece, Purcell notes that one of the basic
hypotheses underlying the seminar is that the “neutral” and “colorblind” nature of
the formal law does not necessarily mean that it is always “neutral” and “colorblind”
in terms of its sources, content, applications, and consequences. There are many
aspects of law where race is never formally mentioned and is neither recognized nor
recognizable in the issues, concepts, principles, and doctrines that define their
content. Nonetheless, race may actually be a relevant and even critical factor in the
implicit assumptions, standard operations, or practical consequences of the law in
those fields. Significant segments of American property law display the truth of that
hypothesis. As the teacher of the property law session within the Race, Bias, and
Advocacy seminar, my primary task is to select a small slice of that enormous body of
law as a vehicle to demonstrate how a contemporary, superficially neutral regulatory
system may operate in ways that hide both a deeply racist history and ongoing
behavior with acutely discriminatory effects.
I chose land use law and, specifically, zoning regulations. Though zoning statutes
and rules arose from a distinctly racist social milieu and early statutes were explicitly
designed to separate white and Black neighborhoods, 2 the statutes that became
models for twentieth-century legal norms were themselves linguistically neutral as to
race and ethnicity.3 Over time, racialized expressions faded from many public fora,

1.

Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Introduction, Race Across the Curriculum: A Team-Taught Course on Law and Race
in America, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 125 (2021–2022).

2.

Many early twentieth-century zoning ordinances were written to impose residential segregation. See
Matthew D. Lassiter & Susan Cianci Salvatore, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Civil Rights in
America: Racial Discrimination in Housing 8–9 (2021). The Louisville ordinance in Buchanan v.
Warley, for example, barred the sale or rental of housing units to Blacks if a majority of neighboring
residents were white, and the sale or rental of housing units to whites if a majority of neighboring residents
were Black. 245 U.S. 60, 70–72 (1917). A number of cities, including Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham,
Dallas, Louisville, Miami, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, Richmond, and St. Louis, adopted similar
controls. Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law 45 (2017).
For an interesting book dealing with early twentieth-century efforts to segregate towns and cities
in North Carolina specifically, and the varying attitudes of upper- and middle-class white populations
about that effort, see Elizabeth A. Herbin-Triant, Threatening Property (2019). Members of
the upper class often were concerned about ease of access for their Black household and factory
employees while the middle class was worried about job competition and social contact. Id. This essay,
however, involves measures adopted during the late 1920s and later years that did not contain overt
expressions about racial zones.

3.

A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which empowered localities to impose housing regulations and
restrictions to promote the “health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community,” was written
in the 1920s at the behest of the Department of Commerce while Herbert Hoover was secretary, and
became the model for much of zoning law in the twentieth century. A Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act § 1 (Advisory Comm. on Zoning 1926); see Richard H. Chused, Eucild’s Historical
Imagery, 51 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 597, 598–99 (2001) [hereinafter Euclid’s Historical Imagery].
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and civil rights statutes found their way into federal, state, and local codes,4 but
segregated housing patterns remained.5 Much of this outcome can be traced to the
century-long ways that zoning practices, combined with government-sponsored
redlining,6 the white real estate industry’s intolerance, and institutionally-sponsored
racial covenants,7 matured and ripened into a system that efficiently sustained
segregated housing patterns.
The class that I teach is designed to describe the history and contours of zoning’s
racial origins, the reasons why those origins became embedded in zoning practice
and effectively maintained segregated housing patterns, and the contemporary search
for possible antidotes. This essay is a tentative effort to describe the nature of the
class, the materials used, and the conclusions that I hope to draw from the inquiry.
The class is deeply historical, running from the turn of the twentieth century through
the present day. It is no surprise that the negative impacts from use of racial
classifications have long been present in land use law. Coping with racism in the
operation of American zoning law has been a major challenge since the onset of
regulatory efforts to control land use patterns at the end of the nineteenth and
beginning of the twentieth centuries.
With the 1985 publication of Kenneth Jackson’s classic book Crabgrass Frontier,8 it
became widely accepted that virtually every arm of the residential real estate industry
in the United States during most of the twentieth century was ingrained with practices
explicitly designed to exclude Black people from white neighborhoods.9 This
knowledge, however, does not make for obvious ways to solve the resulting problems.
The class therefore begins with earlier overt and widely accepted exploitation of race
before moving to the segregated housing patterns resulting from marginally more
subtle but certainly not obscure practices in the last half of the twentieth century, and
4.

See The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/civil-rights-act/legal-events-timeline (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).

5.

See Sam Fulwood III, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The United States’ History of Segregated
Housing Continues to Limit Affordable Housing 2–3 (2016).

6.

LaDale C. Winling & Todd M. Michney, The Roots of Redlining: Academic, Governmental, and
Professional Networks in the Making of the New Deal Lending Regime, 108 J. Am. Hist. 42, 44 (2021).
Recent news articles also emphasize the continuing impact of redlining on housing patterns. See, e.g.,
Emily Badger, How Redlining’s Racist Effects Lasted for Decades, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/upshot/how-redlinings-racist-effects-lasted-for-decades.html; Brad
Plumer & Nadja Popovich, How Decades of Racist Housing Policy Left Neighborhoods Sweltering, N.Y.
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/24/climate/racism-redlining-cities-globalwarming.html (Aug. 31, 2022).

7.

Many racial covenants were crafted by white real estate associations. Catherine Silva, Racial Restrictive
Covenants History, Segregated Seattle, Seattle C.R. & Lab. Hist. Project, https://depts.washington.
edu/civilr/covenants_report.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (naming land developers and real estate
companies behind hundreds of racially restrictive covenants in Seattle neighborhoods).

8.

Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier (1985); see also Rothstein, supra note 2 (delving into
race-based real estate practices with a great deal of additional information and new vigor).

9.

Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Books of the Times, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at C28 (endorsing
professional recognition of Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier).
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to those using “neutral” standards having enormous racial effects. Those inquiries are
followed with a review of legal “solutions” tried during the second half of the twentieth
century that, for the most part, failed to resolve the problems.
The class ends with a search for new ways to address segregated housing, including
some strategies that focus more on the nature of the housing market than on explicit
limitations of racial restraints. The overall message encourages students to consider
structural changes that avoid expensive and time-consuming litigation strategies as
well as other cumbersome ways of controlling racial bias, and focus instead on the use
of incentives and tactics to enhance the development of diverse communities. If typical
legal tools available for contesting racial practices are difficult to use or hard to
manage, then clever, strategic decision makers must search for other ways to cope.
II. EARLY, OBVIOUS, OVERT, AND WIDELY ACCEPTED HOUSING SEGREGATION

A. The Euclid Era and the Origins of Zoning

The seminar’s opening materials reflect the historical reality that race, ethnicity,
and poverty were never far below the surface of American culture between the end of
the Civil War and the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of the famous case of Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,10 in 1926. Euclid was the first case decided by the
Supreme Court to approve the use of zoning by local governments to control land use
patterns. Though that case is sometimes seen as a precursor to the Court’s approval of
New Deal legislation a decade later,11 it actually was a deeply conservative decision
motivated in significant part by negative reflections about race, immigration, and
poverty.12 Such sentiments were made clear from the outset in the federal district
court opinion of Judge David Westenhaver,13 who found the Village of Euclid’s zoning
plan unconstitutional.14 The plan declared various land areas in the town suitable for
only certain types of uses—industrial, commercial, apartments, duplexes, single10.

272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).

11.

See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937).

12.

See generally Euclid’s Historical Imagery, supra note 3 (laying out the history of Euclid, including a great
deal of theoretical, political, and judicial analysis). Some of the material used in this section of the essay
is a sharply modified version of that article. Associate Justice George Sutherland delivered the opinion of
the Euclid Court; he was joined by Chief Justice William Howard Taft and Associate Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr., Louis D. Brandeis, Edward Terry Sanford, and Harlan F. Stone. 272 U.S. at 379.
Associate Justices Willis Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds, and Pierce Butler dissented without
opinion. Id. at 397.

13.

President Woodrow Wilson appointed Westenhaver to the federal bench in 1917, in significant part
because of the influence of Ambler Realty’s attorney, Newton Baker. See Timothy Alan Fluck, Euclid v.
Ambler: A Retrospective, 52 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 326, 328 (1986). Baker served as Wilson’s secretary of war
and was a close friend and some time law partner of Westenhaver. Id.; see also William M. Randle,
Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The Players in Euclid v. Ambler, in Zoning and the
American Dream 33–35, 40–42 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). “Though Judge
Westenhaver had close ties to Baker, it is virtually impossible to contend that his [trial level] opinion in
Euclid distorted prior Supreme Court jurisprudence on race, regulation of property, and the Constitution
in Ambler Realty’s favor.” Euclid’s Historical Imagery, supra note 3, at 604.

14.

Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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family houses, or some combination of these uses.15 Constraints also were imposed on
lot size and building lines.16 The district court opinion was embedded with a distinctly
pre-New Deal form of judicial racism.17 While Justice Sutherland’s later opinion for
the Supreme Court lacked some of the overtly racist language penned by Westenhaver,
the Court perversely mirrored the same racist ideas while upholding zoning.
During the two-year period before Westenhaver rendered his January 1924
decision against Euclid’s zoning plan, the Supreme Court decided three cases which,
as a group, cast great doubt on the ability of states to regulate land or the economy
while affirming the vitality of a well-defined form of Jim Crow-era intolerance.18 In
his 1924 Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid opinion, Westenhaver noted that many
of the older cases affirming state land use regulations under the police power involved
statutes designed to bar placement near residences of activities commonly viewed as
nuisances, like livery stables and brick manufacturing facilities.19 Such cases made it
easy for him to view the sorts of land use restrictions imposed by Euclid’s ordinance
as quite different from the typical regulatory fare that had previously come before the
Supreme Court.20
Though there were certainly some examples that were hard for Westenhaver to
deal with, 21 most of the cases gave significant support for his general thesis that the
primary objectives of Euclid’s zoning plan unconstitutionally restricted the present
and future use of the land without just compensation, rather than enhanced the
general welfare. The Supreme Court commonly created dichotomies between just
compensation or freedom of contract on the one hand and the general welfare on the
other in cases decided at the end of the nineteenth and the first few decades of the
15.

See Euclid, Ohio, Plan. & Zoning Code tit. 5–11 (1922).

16.

Id.; see also Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380–84 (detailing the ordinance’s terms).

17.

See Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 313 (“The blighting of property values and the congesting of population,
whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade a residential section, are so well known as to be
within the judicial cognizance.”).

18.

The three cases were Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414–15 (1922), which found that
Pennsylvania’s attempt to control subsidence of the surface from mining activities was a taking, Adkins
v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 558 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), which invalidated a Washington, D.C., minimum wage statute, and
Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923), which struck down a
Kansas compulsory labor arbitration statute. The first was a takings case, while the latter two involved
freedom of contract.

19.

See 297 F. at 315 (first citing Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (livery stable); and
then citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard)).

20. 297 F. at 311 (“It cannot be said that the Supreme Court of the United States has decided definitely or

finally the exact questions here involved.”).

21.

E.g., Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 104 (1909) (finding it reasonable for a city to mandate different
height limitations for commercial buildings versus residential buildings). On Welch v. Swasey,
Westenhaver could say little more than that the case involved “merely a reasonable regulation of the
height of buildings.” Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 315. Presumably, he viewed it as a legitimate exercise
of the police power. See id.
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twentieth centuries. Westenhaver found strong support from both lines of cases to
sustain Ambler Realty’s challenge to Euclid’s zoning plan.22
A prime example relied on heavily by Judge Westenhaver was the 1917 Supreme
Court case of Buchanan v. Warley.23 Westenhaver argued that if, as Buchanan held, a
Louisville ordinance requiring the establishment of segregated residential zones24
was invalid as a restriction on the right of a white person to freely contract with a
Black person for the sale of a dwelling, then certainly Euclid’s zoning plan had to
fall. It was so obvious to Westenhaver that “colored” people and “certain foreign
races” were nuisances, that the Supreme Court’s refusal to approve racial zoning
made it impossible to validate zoning for most other purposes. If you could not
segregate by race, Westenhaver could not imagine what other purpose could be
constitutionally justified. Comparing the Buchanan and Ambler Realty Co. ordinances,
he wrote:
It seems to me that no candid mind can deny that more and stronger reasons
exist, having a real and substantial relation to the public peace, supporting
[the Louisville] ordinance than can be urged under any aspect of the police
power to support the present ordinance as applied to plaintiff ’s property. And
no gift of second sight is required to foresee that if this Kentucky statute had
been sustained, its provisions would have spread from city to city throughout
the length and breadth of the land. And it is equally apparent that the next
step in the exercise of this police power would be to apply similar restrictions
for the purpose of segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived
immigrants. The blighting of property values and the congesting of
population, whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade a residential
section, are so well known as to be within the judicial cognizance. 25

Westenhaver’s reliance on Buchanan was part of a distinctly pre–New Deal legal
construct about race and freedom of contract that is strange to present-day
22.

Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 312 (first citing Adkins, 261 U.S. at 558 (freedom of contract); then citing
Charles Wolff Packing Co., 262 U.S. at 544 (freedom of contract); then citing Eubank v. City of
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912) (police power); then citing Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 596–
97 (1917) (police power), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); and then citing
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (police power)).

23.

245 U.S. at 60.

24.

Many cities across the country adopted racial zoning statutes during the early twentieth century. See
Katie Nodjimbadem, The Racial Segregation of American Cities Was Anything but Accidental, Smithsonian
Mag. (May 30, 2017), https://w w w.smithsonianmag.com/history/how-federal-governmentintentionally-racially-segregated-american-cities-180963494/. Baltimore was the first city to pass such
an ordinance, in 1910. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 44. A bevy of others followed, including Atlanta,
Birmingham, Miami, Charleston, Dallas, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, and Richmond. Id. St. Louis
was the first city to adopt one by referendum, in 1916. Walter Johnson, The Broken Heart of
America 253–55 (2020). St. Louis was also the first city to use city planning techniques to limit the
extent of Black residential areas after Buchanan rendered express racial zoning unconstitutional. Id.
Harland Bartholomew was the city planner for St. Louis in 1918; he went on to produce similar plans
for a multitude of other U.S. cities. Id. at 292–95.

25.

Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 312–13.

312

VOLUME 66 | 2021/22

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

sensibilities.26 The factual structure of Buchanan helps us understand how this worked.
William Warley, the Black president of a then-recently established Louisville chapter
of the NAACP, 27 agreed to buy a house from Charles Buchanan, a white man, in
violation of the Louisville racial zoning ordinance.28 The ordinance barred a party of
one race from purchasing a dwelling on a block of houses occupied by a majority of
another race. The parties wished to test the validity of the ordinance.29 Accordingly,
they inserted a clause in the contract allowing Warley to decline to perform under the
deal if the Louisville ordinance barring him from taking possession was valid.
The test litigation began after Warley refused to settle the deal and Buchanan
sued for specific performance. Note well that it was Buchanan, the white seller, who
claimed that Warley was obligated to perform because the ordinance was
unconstitutional; Warley, the Black buyer, resisted by claiming that the apartheid
zoning statute was valid.30 This role reversal was a clever but deeply perverse strategic
move, for it placed the white seller at the forefront of the case and presented the
courts with a “simple” claim by a white man that he was entitled to specific
performance of a standard contract for the sale of residential real estate. 31 The
Supreme Court took the bait, finding the racial zoning scheme invalid on the ground
that it infringed upon the substantive due process right of a white man to be free
from unlawful constraints on the enforcement of a contract for the sale of real estate
voluntarily agreed to by the parties.
What went unsaid in both Justice William R. Day’s opinion in Buchanan and
Judge Westenhaver’s opinion in Ambler Realty Co. was that racially restrictive covenant
schemes—as opposed to governmental zoning statutes—were completely acceptable
in that era. 32 Such arrangements, in which white people in a neighborhood
26. See James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on “Buchanan v. Warlcy,” [sic] Property Rights, and Race, 51 Vand. L.

Rev. 953, 953–54 (1998) (stating that Buchanan does not reflect post–New Deal jurisprudence).

27.

See Warley, William [Buchanan v. Warley], Notable Ky. Afr. Ams. Database [hereinafter Warley,
William], https://nkaa.uky.edu/nkaa/items/show/35 (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).

28. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 72–73.
29. Warley, William, supra note 27.
30. See Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 70 (reciting Warley’s argument that the Louisville ordinance barred him from

occupying the residence in issue); see also Richard A. Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the “Progressive Era,” Vand. L. Rev. 787, 788 (1998) (“The [B]lack buyer
refused to take title on the ground that the local zoning ordinance made it impossible for him to live on
the premises.”).

31.

Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 72 (“[Plaintiff] attack[s] the ordinance upon the ground that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . , in that it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States to acquire and enjoy property, takes property without due process of law, and denies equal
protection of the laws.”).

32.

Explicit racial zoning continued to be enforced even after Buchanan was decided. Rothstein, supra note
2, at 46–48 (“[I]n 1929, . . . [t]he Orlando suburb of Apopka adopted an ordinance banning [B]lacks from
living on the north side of the railroad tracks and whites from living on the south side. It remained in
effect until 1968.”). The “death” of such practices was slow and painful. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1, 13 (1948) (concluding that purely private racially restrictive covenants are not violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment absent state action).

313

STRATEGIC THINKING ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICAN ZONING

contractually agreed not to sell or rent property to non-whites using a property
structure binding on successors in interest, came into widespread use early in the
twentieth century.33 These covenants were explicitly approved by the Supreme Court
in Corrigan v. Buckley 34 shortly after Westenhaver rendered his opinion in Ambler
Realty Co., but the views he expressed in that opinion certainly suggest that he was
not surprised by the result.
Both the Buchanan and Corrigan Courts concluded that the Equal Protection
Clause required that states guarantee only “political” or “legal” equality—the rights
of each person white or Black to, for example, vote and avail themselves of the
freedom to contract about their labor and assets.35 “Social equality,” however, was
beyond the capacity of the law to bestow and thus vulnerable to state police power
regulation for the public welfare. In fact, regulating social equality by, among other
things, adopting segregation rules, had clearly been allowed as part of the police
power since at least 1896 when the Supreme Court approved public transportation
segregation rules in Plessy v. Ferguson.36 But protecting contract and property rights
was about legal not social equality and therefore not typically subject to government
regulation. Justice Day stated this quite clearly in Buchanan: “These enactments [in
Louisville] did not deal with the social rights of men, but with those fundamental
rights in property which it was intended to secure upon the same terms to citizens of
every race and color.”37 He continued:
The case presented does not deal with an attempt to prohibit the
amalgamation of the races. The right which the ordinance annulled was the civil
right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person
of color and of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person. 38

When all was said and done, Westenhaver’s opinion in Ambler Realty Co. was an
expression of shock that the Buchanan Court did not approve racial zoning
regulations. It was difficult for him to fathom the idea that segregation by zoning
33.

See, e.g., Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4–7 (involving racially restrictive covenants created in 1911 and 1934).
Racial covenants began appearing in many cities in the 1920s as a tactic to overcome Buchanan’s
restrictions. See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 78.

34. 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). The most complete opinion in the Corrigan litigation was rendered by the

D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See 299 F. 899, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (“The constitutional right of a
negro to acquire, own, and occupy property does not carry with it the constitutional power to compel
sale and conveyance to him of any particular private property.”). The Supreme Court affirmed. 271 U.S.
at 330. The lack of state action was critical to the case and meant that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not a limitation on the use of private racial covenants. Id.

35.

See Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 330; Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79.

36. 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (“If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one, cannot be

inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the [c]onstitution of
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); see Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1923, 1935 (2000).

37.

245 U.S. at 79.

38. Id. at 81.
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was not a vitally important police power method of limiting “the amalgamation of
the races” and the spread of social equality—ideas considered by most white
Americans of the time as pernicious. Claims of social equality, Westenhaver believed,
could best be constrained by allowing each race to “freely” contract only within its
segregated residential zone.39 However, because the Buchanan Court concluded that
racial zoning was better characterized as an unlawful limitation on freedom of
contract than as a legitimate attempt to bar social equality, Westenhaver felt
compelled to invalidate a general zoning scheme based on a legislative claim of police
power authority much more tenuous to him than the one deployed in Buchanan to
support Louisville’s residential segregation ordinance.
Judge Westenhaver presumably was surprised when the Supreme Court disagreed
with him and approved Euclid’s zoning regulations. But he may also have been
pleased that Justice Sutherland’s opinion for the Court was perversely permeated with
racially charged code words and intolerant attitudes, much like Westenhaver’s.40
Discussing the Euclid case, therefore, is a good starting point for the zoning class.41 It
introduces the idea that judicial opinions about racial subjects must be carefully and
thoughtfully parsed for the ways language that is not racist on its face may have been
used to “politely” (at least for its time) express underlying racial motivations.
The path for the Euclid Court’s use of ethnically and racially encumbered logic
and language was opened by a strategic amicus curiae brief filed by Alfred Bettman
on behalf of the National Conference on City Planning.42 Like the perversely clever
NAACP strategy used in Buchanan, Bettman found a savvy pathway for convincing
conservative Supreme Court justices to approve zoning without undermining their
belief in freedom of contract theory or their antipathy to social equality. Bettman
neither relied on the prior treatment of social and legal equality as dichotomous nor
claimed that Euclid was about setting freedom of contract off against the police
power—the very distinctions relied upon by Judge Westenhaver.
Rather, Bettman suggested that the issues before the Court were best solved by
analogizing zoning to nuisance law.43 The dispute, he claimed, was really about efforts
39.

Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 312–13 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365
(1926). Westenhaver also relied on two freedom of contract cases. Id. at 312 (first citing Adkins v.
Child.’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); and then citing Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Indus.
Rels., 262 U.S. 522 (1923)).

40. Compare Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394 (characterizing an apartment house in a single residential section as “a

mere parasite”), with Ambler Realty Co., 297 F. at 313 (opining that property values diminish and
populations boom “whenever the colored or certain foreign races invade a residential section”).

41.

As previously noted, the full history of Euclid is told in Euclid’s Historical Imagery, supra note 3. An
excerpt from that article is used in the class materials, along with the Court’s Euclid opinion.

42.

See Am. Plan. Ass’n, Commentary, Village of Euclid v. Ambler: The Bettman Amicus Brief, 58 Plan. &
Env’t L. 3 (2006) [hereinafter Bettman Brief], https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.
journals/planevirw58&id=63&collection=journals&index= (reproducing the Bettman brief).

43.

Id. at 6 (“Zoning has [the] Same Fundamental Purposes and Justification as All Other Property
Regulation, Including Law of Nuisances; but Zoning is not [a] Mere Suppression of Nuisance; it is
Constructive Planning for Prevention of Developments Detrimental to Public Health, Convenience,
Safety, Morals and Welfare.”).
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by the Village of Euclid to reduce the likelihood of conflicts between neighboring
landowners and to grant local governments the power to make rational decisions
about separating potentially incompatible land uses. While that argument involved
discussion of the police power, it elided discussion of previously used, difficult to
define, dichotomies. The Supreme Court took the bait just as it did in Buchanan.
Bettman made it possible for Justice Sutherland to eschew the overtly racist language
of Judge Westenhaver in favor of a more “politic” exploration of the social power of
ethnic, class, and racial differences.44 This strategy made it possible for the Court to
view the dispute as one about the general impacts of zoning on real estate development
rather than on the management of particular contractual obligations or on the claims
of developers about their right to develop property as they wished.45
Use of the nuisance analogy required the Court to think about various ways
common land uses may clash in urban settings.46 Justice Sutherland found it easy to
justify separating industrial and factory uses from residential zones. But he stated
greater concerns about separating various kinds of residential areas. And it is at this
point in the Euclid opinion that the Court’s attitudes about race, immigration, and
wealth mirrored much of Westenhaver’s perspective. But Sutherland did so without
relying on the differences between social and legal equality or between the police
power and freedom of contract. Carefully parse Sutherland’s language:
[T]he development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the
coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the
entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the
apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of
the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character
of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by
others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller
homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises
incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of
moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus
detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet
and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities,—until,

44. See id. at 8 (discussing social factors for zoning).
45.

Another Bettman move made this possible as well. He argued that the structure of the case brought by
Ambler Realty challenged the entire zoning scheme, not its impact on the company’s particular parcel:
[T]he appellee . . . ha[s] not chosen to restrict [its] attack [to] a particular provision of
this particular ordinance or the special nature of its effect upon the particular piece of
property of the appellee, but ha[s] attacked the constitutionality of zoning of the
general type of the ordinance in this case.

Id. at 3. In modern parlance, it was a facial challenge. If, Bettman went on, Ambler wished to challenge
the impact of the zoning scheme on its land, it could always bring a suit raising such an issue without
contesting zoning generally. Id. at 3–4. Indeed, the Supreme Court decided such a case invalidating
zoning as applied to a particular parcel only two years after it decided Euclid. See Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928).
46. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386–87.
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finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a
place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances,
apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only entirely
unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances.47

The stunning language equating apartment houses with parasites(!) and nuisances
was the racially loaded but “politic” core of the opinion. Race itself was not an express
part of the discourse. The images it brought to mind, however, were of tenement
house districts filled with immigrants, Black residents, and the poor.48 Jacob Riis’s
1890 book, How the Other Half Lives, was filled with drawings and surreptitiously
taken photographs of tenement house residents;49 Upton Sinclair’s famous 1906
novel, The Jungle, portrayed the degradation and poverty of such districts.50 Both
books, or at least the public perceptions of tenement houses they helped create, must
still have resonated with Justice Sutherland and his colleagues.51
Figure 1 Lodgers in a Crowded Bayard Street Tenement—“Five Cents a Spot.”52

47.

Id. at 394–95.

48. See, e.g., Jacob Riis, How the Other Half Lives (1890) (studying living conditions of the urban poor).
49. Id. For background on the history of surreptitious photography and the undercover photographs used in

the book, see Richard Chused, Appropriate(d) Moments, 26 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L.J. 103, 116, 127–28 (2015) [hereinafter Appropriate(d) Moments].

50. Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (1906).
51.

Justice Sutherland, born in 1862, was twenty-eight when Riis’s book was published and forty-four when
Sinclair’s tome was released. A Property Anthology 129–34 (Richard H. Chused ed., 2d ed. 1997)
(citing Shame of the Cities and The Jungle to describe the impact of tenement housing on the Supreme Court).

52.

This image and its caption are taken from Riis, supra note 48, at 69.
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Buchanan and Euclid left land use regulation in a place that easily accommodated
the widespread community racism prevalent in the early twentieth-century housing
market. First, contract theory allowed racial covenants and servitudes to flourish.53
To the courts, these were simply contracts between two willing white people who
agreed not to sell or rent property to non-whites.54 Who could quarrel with that?
The use of racial covenants was extremely widespread and government supported.55
Second, racial zoning, also relying on contract theory, was said to violate the rights
of white and Black people to contract with each other to transfer property if both
were willing participants.56 Given the prevalence of racial servitudes, of course, that
did not happen very often, at least not between a white seller and a Black buyer. The
servitudes effectively served the function of racial zoning. Third, when white real
estate associations saw that, despite racial covenants, a neighborhood was likely to
“flip” from white to Black, they were free to induce panic in white owners, buy up
their land, and sell at inflated prices to Black purchasers.57
Finally, the standard zoning acts adopted in the 1920s left decision making in
the hands of local authorities subject to the racism of their communities. For example,
the zoning structure crafted by the Ohio legislature granted authority to zone to
towns across the state, effectively allowing if not encouraging each community to put
their racial preferences into regulatory policy.58 That model was later adopted when
the Harding administration’s secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, appointed an
advisory committee on zoning, which published and encouraged the adoption of A
53.

See Nancy H. Welsh, Racially Restrictive Covenants in the United States: A Call to Action, 12 Agora J.
Urb. Plan. & Design 130, 135 (2018) (adding that Corrigan also gave “developers and white
homeowners . . . free rein to construct racially exclusive communities through legal agreements”).

54. This point was explicitly made in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).
55.

See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 81–83.

56. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81–82 (1917). Buchanan found that the right of any person to

contract for the sale of a dwelling to any other person was constitutionally protected and could not be
inhibited by state action. Id. That result did not disturb the later outcome of Corrigan because, in
Corrigan, the Supreme Court held that the racial covenants were a private contract that did not arise
from state action and were therefore unconstrained by the Constitution. 271 U.S. at 330–31. That legal
result governed until Shelley v. Kraemer in 1948, which effectively nullified all racial covenants by
proscribing state enforcement thereof. 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).

57.

Rothstein, supra note 2, at 12–13, 94–99. This practice became known as “blockbusting.” Id.
Blockbusters’ tactics included hiring African American women to push carriages with
their babies through white neighborhoods, hiring African American men to drive cars
with radios blasting through white neighborhoods, . . . [and posting] real estate
advertisements in African American newspapers . . . to attract potential African
American buyers to walk around white areas that were targeted for blockbusting . . . .

Id. at 95–96; see also James Alan McPherson, The Story of the Contract Buyers League, The Atlantic,
Apr. 1972, at 51, 53 (noting that “poor” but “eager Black families” followed blockbusters into conditional
sales contracts that allowed them to “take immediate possession of the property, but [gave] no equity or
title until [paid in] full”).
58. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 713.12 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through File 90 (H.B. 188) of 134th (2021–

2022) Gen. Assemb.).
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Standard State Zoning Enabling Act in 1924, and a revised act in 1926.59 That
proposal became the model used by cities and towns nationwide.
By the time Euclid was decided, many large cities were surrounded by small towns,
each with the power to zone. Those zoning rules—typically written in “race neutral”
language60 —actually guaranteed the ability of thousands of local communities across
the nation to structure their rules to entice well-to-do citizens as residents, leaving
Blacks, immigrants, and the poor as occupants of the inner cities unable to buy
suburban housing.61 The combination of class-based zoning and racial covenants
solidified housing segregation as a core instinct of the American housing market.62
B. The Mid-Twentieth Century and Large Scale Institutionally Supported Racism

One of the central features of Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier was its
thorough review of the federal government’s role in furthering the segregation
potential of the Euclid era’s structure of zoning and contractual freedom to establish
racially “pure” neighborhoods through the use of racial servitudes.63 But Jackson also
explored in depth the role of large-scale institutional,64 business, and governmental
interests in supporting housing segregation. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation,
a New Deal organization established to insure residential loans in an effort to help
revive the economy, issued “redlining” maps for every city of importance in the
United States. The Manhattan map, issued in 1936,65 is displayed below and included
in the class materials.

59.

A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (Advisory Comm. on Zoning 1926).

60. For an example of a race-based ordinance pre-Euclid, see Balt., Md., Ordinance 692 (May 15, 1911):

“An ordinance for preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feeling between the white and colored
races in Baltimore city, and promoting the general welfare of the city by providing, so far as practicable,
for the use of separate blocks by white and colored people for residences, churches and schools.”

61.

Ana Cláudia Castilho Barone, Harland Bartholomew e o zoneamento racialmente informado: o caso de St.
Louis [Harland Bartholomew and Racially Informed Zoning: The Case of St. Louis], 20 Revista Brasileira
de Estudos Urbanos e Regionais [Rev. Bras. Estud. Urbanos Reg.] 437, 451 (2018) (Braz.)
(examining city laws designed to repel Black Americans from longtime neighborhoods by zoning those
neighborhoods for industrial uses while shutting Blacks out from new development designed for white
Americans).

62. Racially restrictive covenants (and those targeting “ethnic and religious groups, such as Asian Americans

and Jews”) remain in homeowners’ deeds nationwide. Cheryl W. Thompson et al., Racial Covenants, A
Relic of the Past, Are Still on the Books Across the Country, NPR (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.npr.
org/2021/11/17/1049052531/racial-covenants-housing-discrimination (reporting on residual racial,
ethnic, and religious covenants in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, and Virginia).

63. See Jackson, supra note 8 at 195–203, 209–15, 226–29, 293–95.
64. Even churches, synagogues, and major universities were in the business of arranging for the

establishment and maintenance of racial covenants. Id.; see Rothstein, supra note 2, at 103–05.

65.

Robert K. Nelson et al., Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America, Maps, Am. Panorama,
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).
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Figure 2 1936 Home Owners’ Loan Corporation Maps for Manhattan66
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Kitchen

Lower
East Side

Harlem

Property transfers in green areas—almost entirely white neighborhoods—were
literally given the green light.67 At the opposite end of the spectrum, red areas—
typically Black and immigrant neighborhoods—were explicitly given a “hazardous”
label. It quite literally meant, “Don’t go there, and if you do, don’t expect support
from the government or major housing institutions.”68 Maps like these hung on the
66. Id.
67.

Id. Note that the only area in Manhattan given the green light was the East Side adjacent to Central
Park. Id. Harlem, the Lower East Side immigrant areas, and the entire West Side received a variety of
lower grades. Id.; see also Bruce Mitchell & Juan Franco, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal.,
HOLC “Redlining” Maps: The Persistent Structure of Segregation and Economic
Inequality 9 (2018) (studying the lingering effects of race-based redlining).

68. The color codes on the maps, including the Upper and Lower Manhattan maps reproduced here, were

labeled as “First Grade” through “Fourth Grade.” Nelson et al., supra note 65. The colors used—for
example, green and red—may, however, connote the common interpretation of those colors: “go” and
“stop.” And that is how they were construed in real life.
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walls in government, insurance, real estate, lending companies, and other real estate
organizations all across the country into the 1950s.69 These enterprises all followed
the government’s lead, making it virtually impossible for Black buyers to obtain
standard insurance policies, mortgages, or other forms of support.70 Similar practices
emerged in the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) and Veterans Affairs’ (VA)
loan insurance markets and other federal and local housing support programs.71
Governments at all levels simply refused to assist programs for Black homebuyers, for
white projects near Black communities, and for housing transactions in neighborhoods
thought to be in danger of flipping.72 In one case, a Detroit developer went to extreme
lengths to get FHA support by building a “half-mile concrete wall” that was six feet
tall and one foot thick between his development and a nearby Black neighborhood.73
Some of the redlining maps were moved to “back rooms” during and after the
civil rights era. While use of the maps and the highly structured racism in government
housing programs were illegal by the middle of the twentieth century, the assumptions
portrayed in the redlining maps, loan practices, and housing subsidy programs still
permeate much of the industry and the culture at large. The segregated housing
patterns left behind by the long history of racism in private and government programs
are now our living heritage.
III.	UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATION OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY HOUSING
SEGREGATION

The historical section of the course materials concludes with two hypothetical
problems for students to ponder. The first assumes that race—often disguised by
using poverty as a proxy after the 1950s—was a permissible factor for localities to
consider when making zoning decisions, even though public use of overtly racist
language was impolitic and illegal.
Problem 1: Before the focus of these materials changes to look for solutions
to the ways in which zoning encouraged metropolitan area racial segregation,
work on this problem to solidify your understanding of how the system
operated. Assume that the time period is the late 1950s or the 1960s. Suppose

69. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 64.
70. See Michael J. Klarman, Unfinished Business 140–41 (2007); see also Kenneth B. Clark, Dark

Ghetto 11–20 (1965) (describing government-supported practices encouraging segregation);
McPherson, supra note 57, at 58 (describing “a vile race tax” that transformed a Black purchaser’s
sixteen-thousand-dollar house into a $46,780 one).

71.

See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 64–67, 70–75; Robert C. Weaver, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination
Legislation Upon the FHA- and VA-Insured Housing Market in New York State, 31 Land Econ. 303,
305–06 (1955).

72. See Samuel George et al., Samuel Dubois Cook Ctr. on Soc. Equity at Duke Univ., The

Plunder of Black Wealth in Chicago: New Findings on the Lasting Toll of Predatory
Housing Contracts 1 (Sharon McCloskey & Bruce Orenstein eds., 2019) (“[F]ederal policy and
banking practices pushed [B]lack Americans into a secondary, unregulated market that often left them
stripped of any wealth they had accumulated—or hoped to accumulate—through home ownership.”).

73. See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 74.
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you are the middle class, white mayor of a small suburban community outside
of a large city. The vast bulk of the farm and non-farm population in your
town is the same—middle (or even upper) class and white. Your town is still
largely rural but is facing a great deal of pressure to approve large new projects
from developers and others interested in building new housing and businesses
in the area. Part of that pressure is arising because a new interstate highway
linking your community with the neighboring city’s downtown business
district will be opening for use in about a year.

What recommendations would you make to your town council about how to
reconfigure the zoning rules in your community? What sorts of land uses
would you like to encourage? What sorts of people would you like to attract
to the town? What sorts of land uses would you like to discourage? What
sorts of people would you like to prevent from living in your area? Give
reasons for your decisions. Think carefully about this problem, putting
yourself in the position of the mayor trying to meet the preferences of others
now residing in the community. This obviously gives you permission to
(presumably uncomfortably) use race invidiously. But note, however, that
some care is required in describing your new land use plan since this problem
occurs after the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education74 desegregation decision.
We will spend time in class thinking together about this problem.

For a property law class like this, the problem is a bit perverse. It asks the students
to think not about curing hidden bias, but to get inside the head of a politician eager
to use race as a dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable land uses.75 Even
after enforcement of racial covenants and servitudes were invalidated in 1948 by
Shelley v. Kraemer,76 local authorities found that zoning was a very powerful tool for
maintaining residential segregation. Among other techniques, they became experts
at using class as a reasonably strong proxy for race. The Supreme Court has never
treated the use of wealth-based distinctions as deserving of special equal protection
surveillance.77
By the middle of the twentieth century, even though town leaders had to be more
careful about overtly announcing that race governed their decision making than did
those making local government decisions in Westenhaver’s era, it was not hard to
convey similar motivations using other language. Euclid, remember, had already
74.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

75. In general, students catch on quickly, do a good job of working out a zoning plan under these constraints,

and are not at all upset by taking on this role. It gives them a better understanding of how zoning has
operated over the decades.

76. 334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948). As with the continued use of racial zoning after the decision in Buchanan,

there was substantial resistance to implementing the result in Shelley from federal, state, and local
governments, including the courts. See Rothstein, supra note 2, at 86–91.

77.

The high-water mark for treating wealth as a suspicious classification was reached in the 1973 case of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, when four justices dissented from a decision declining to
invalidate the use of property taxes as the primary source of school funding. 411 U.S. 1, 57 (1973) (deferring
to the legislative and democratic processes for state tax and educational reform).
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taught people how to do that.78 By the end of discussing this problem, we invariably
end up with a town having large-lot zoning,79 medium-to-large size dwellings, single
family houses, and, perhaps, white-collar businesses. The overall goals of the town
were to raise enough property taxes to support the community, including the bigticket item of schools, without imposing high tax rates or allowing large populations
that might drain the public fisc to move in. This, of course, is a description of much
of suburbia from the 1960s on.80
This discussion is followed by the second assigned problem concerning the
impact of civil rights litigation and legislation of the post-Shelley and Brown era.
Given the way towns were likely to be zoned as the first problem suggests, were there
any obvious mid-century legal remedies that might be used?
Problem 2: Return to the suggestions that you developed in Problem 1 to
“solve” the mayor’s zoning issues. Did your proposed solution have any racial
impacts? If it didn’t, then you probably didn’t work through the problem very
intensively. If that is the case for you, go back and think through that problem
again! Articulate the racial impacts. What legal remedies, if any, might exist to
cope with results that do have a racial effect? In thinking through your answer,
keep in mind the outcomes in two crucially important cases: Washington v.
Davis, of 1976,81 and Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v.
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., of 2015.82

Davis imposed an obligation on plaintiffs in all race discrimination actions
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged activities were
done intentionally on the ground of race. At the time of the facts in Problem
1, it was not clear whether the Supreme Court would require a showing of
intentional discrimination to bring a constitutional challenge. But there were
many indications that such a requirement was likely. In contrast, Inclusive
Communities allowed for “disparate impact” claims to be made under the
statutory language of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, but only if
two elements are proven. First, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
78. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (using neutral rationale to segregate

residential, business, and industrial uses).

79. Alec LeSher, Large-Lot and Preservation Zoning in Rural Areas, Sustainable Dev. Code, https://sustainable

citycode.org/brief/adopt-large-lot-and-preservation-zoning-in-rural-areas/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2022)
(“[Large-lot zoning] regulations typically require new residential developments in rural areas to have lot
sizes large enough to preserve existing vegetation, open space, and natural features . . . .”).

80. The problems were exacerbated by the federal tax code’s favorable treatment of homeownership. See

Dennis J. Ventry Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage
Interest, 73 L. & Contemp. Probs. 233, 251 (2010). Allowing tax deductions for mortgage interest
incentiveized homeownership but discriminated against tenants, who would receive no deduction for
renting a home. Id. at 257 (citing Bruce Lee Balch, Appraisal of Personal Deductions, in 1 Tax Revision
Compendium 435, 439 (1959)). For a discussion on tax and its relationship to racial disparities in wealth
and rates of homeownership, see Ann F. Thomas, The Racial Wealth Gap and the Tax Benefits of
Homeownership, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 247 (2021–2022).

81.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

82. 576 U.S. 519 (2015).
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defendant’s policies or actions have a “disparate impact” on the basis of race;
that is, that Black members of the class of those intended to benefit from the
statutory or regulatory scheme are negatively impacted in comparison with
other groups.83 Second, the negative impact must be significant. If such a
demonstration is made, the burden shifts to the defendants to justify their
actions on reasonable grounds. Again, this case was decided after the time
period of the facts in Problem 1. But other civil rights statutes operated in
ways quite similar to the results in Inclusive Communities.

Do you think it likely that either a constitutional claim requiring a showing of
intent as in Davis or a statutory claim (like in Inclusive Communities) may
successfully be made against the mayor and town council challenging the
zoning statute that you crafted in Problem 1? If not, what other path do you
suggest trying to resolve the racial discrimination implicitly extant in the
zoning statute? Looking for that solution is the next goal of these materials.

It turns out, of course, that much of the extant legal structure of civil rights law
does not often provide a practical means of challenging the zoning structures of
many suburban communities. After the civil rights era, leaders of suburban
communities tended to keep their racial motivations quiet, at least during public
sessions. The difficulties of proving intent became intense.84 The use of disparate
impact theory required enormous amounts of discovery, perhaps data-hungry social
science studies, and the availability of plaintiffs with standing—each of which was
likely to be either an insurmountable obstacle or too expensive for non-profit groups
to handle. Difficulties were exacerbated by the refusal of the Supreme Court to
subject regulatory distinctions made on the basis of class to any sort of enhanced
review under the Equal Protection Clause.85 These were the obstacles that faced civil
83. Id. at 543 (stating that a private developer’s one-time decision to build in one particular area instead of

another may not constitute a policy for purposes of a Title VIII disparate impact claim).

84. The litigation over a proposal for a subsidized apartment complex in Huntington, New York, for

example, went on for years. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 941–
42 (2d Cir. 1988) (reaching year eight of litigation to find that the town’s actions did not amount to
discriminatory intent but “clearly demonstrate[d] a pattern of stalling efforts to build low-income
housing”); see also Richard H. Chused, Cases, Materials, and Problems in Property 608 (3d ed.
2010) (adding that the 1988 case “was not formally settled until late in 2002,” after delays in the transfer
of title, financing for construction, and plan approvals).

85. In particular, the widespread use of property taxes to support public education has led to pervasive

litigation challenging the way it allows wealthy areas to provide significantly more funds per pupil than
less well-off districts. A challenge to that system of fundraising was taken up by the Supreme Court in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). There, the Court held 5–4 that
access to public education was not a right protected by the Constitution, and that reliance on different
levels of community wealth to fund schools did not violate a suspect classification based on poverty. Id.
at 28–29. Other state courts, including New Jersey, have since required a reconstruction of such school
funding systems. Daphne A. Kenyon, The Property Tax-School Funding Dilemma 8 (2007)
(noting Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, and Utah as the only states not having to defend
against school funding lawsuits). The New Jersey cases have been before the state’s supreme court more
than twenty times, beginning with Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), and then Abbott v.
Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985). See The History of Abbott v. Burke, Educ. L. Ctr., https://edlawcenter.
org/litigation/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).
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rights organizations by the 1960s and 1970s. The ultimate goal of this class is to
encourage students to think a bit outside the box, to seek remedies that do not
necessarily rely on civil rights statutes or the Constitution, but instead look to other
legal or cultural options and perhaps even to state rather than federal law. That, of
course, is what actually happened when the well-known Mount Laurel run of cases
were filed in New Jersey in 1971.86
IV. STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING AFTER 1960

A. Introduction

Housing discrimination on the grounds of race became a major political issue in
the 1960s. Urban disturbances and widespread unrest, in significant part generated
by poor housing conditions in urban areas, created dismay, and pressure for civil
rights reforms in housing arose in both federal and state legislative and judicial fora.
Federal legislation was adopted in 1968, shortly after Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
was assassinated. But imposition of legal constraints on discrimination by landlords,
real estate agents, and property vendors was not the only result of the civil rights era
pressures. A related series of issues arose about the impact of government land-use
control regimes on grounds of economic class as well as race.
Controversy sprang up about the discriminatory impact of federal mortgage
insurance programs and of local zoning ordinances which effectively barred most
lower-cost housing from suburban communities. A substantial number of suburban
jurisdictions permitted only single-family residences or perhaps light, non-polluting
industries or shopping areas to exist within their boundaries. The leadership of major
civil rights groups, including the NAACP, the Urban League, and the National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, were alarmed that use of such
zoning strategies left major inner cities with the task of handling the bulk of lowerand lower-middle-class housing demand at the very time that service and other job
opportunities were leaving those cities and expanding in suburban communities.87
As noted above, finding a legal basis for challenging zoning schemes was not a
straightforward task. Many civil rights advocates hoped that the Supreme Court
would find exclusionary zoning racially discriminatory and therefore invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause. But typical suburban zoning schemes overtly and
expressly excluded persons on only economic, not racial, grounds. Though the impact
of the economic classification was visited disproportionately upon Black Americans,
that impact arose from racially “neutral” regulations. The holding in Washington v.
Davis,88 requiring a showing of intentional use of race in decision making to prevail
in an equal protection case, created an insuperable barrier to most constitutional
86. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713, 718

(N.J. 1975).

87.

See generally Charles M. Haar, Suburbs Under Siege 133 (1996) (adding that all levels of the
judiciary should protect a proposed “right to live in the suburbs”); John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and
the Public Interest, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1685, 1693, 1705 (1998) (appreciating yet challenging Haar’s work).

88. 426 U.S. 229, 239–41 (1976).
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challenges to the racial impacts of suburban zoning schemes. Again, the Supreme
Court was not willing to closely review the class-based effects of zoning under the
Constitution.89 Civil rights groups also investigated the possibility of using federal
civil rights statutes to challenge exclusionary zoning practices. Though
disproportionate impact cases could be brought under civil rights statutes rather than
the Constitution,90 proving disproportionate racial impact in cases involving
economic classifications made by large suburban communities was difficult: costly in
practice and unpredictable in outcome.
Pursuit of traditional civil rights remedies to resolve the problems associated with
suburban zoning was (and remains) a complex, time-consuming, expensive, and
challenging undertaking. The proof requirements to win such cases often require
extensive gathering of social science data, use of expensive expert witnesses, difficult
discovery challenges, and many other problems associated with proving that public
officials discriminated on racial grounds. Even though well-founded suspicions
abounded that racially discriminatory activity was afoot, overt statements of racism
were rarely present.91 Methods had to be found to attack unspoken racial animus that
did not rely on leaping over the difficult proof hurdles, whether they be to prove
intention or to highlight significant disparate impact.
The class materials, therefore, move to posing the question of what could be
done outside of the traditional civil rights legal world to attack suburban zoning. It is
here that I ask students to envision legal strategies and approaches that were not
typically called upon during the civil rights era to attack zoning problems. If the
racial bias that virtually everyone in the real estate field knew was present was not
easily challengeable under traditional remedies, what was the next legal or strategic
pathway? If direct judicial attacks were impractical, could hidden or difficult-toreach bias be challenged indirectly? If the world had moved from dealing with
explicit racial discrimination to coping with implicit and structural racism, what
solutions might lawyers create?
The possibility of using state rather than burdensome federal constitutional or
statutory remedies began to be investigated—a pathway rarely considered during the
bulk of the civil rights era. The historical moment was reached when there was general
agreement that traditional recourse to federal or even state civil rights laws should
simply be avoided. How about looking at state constitutions and zoning enabling acts?
State constitutions and all zoning statutes routinely contained clauses requiring that
89. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 18.
90. E.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. But remember, it wasn’t until 2015 in Inclusive

Communities that the Court expressly approved of the disparate impact standard to establish a prima
facie case under the Fair Housing Act. 576 U.S. 519, 545 (2015). Before that, the Court had only
suggested without deciding that such a standard was appropriate. Town of Huntington v. Huntington
Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 18 (1988).

91.

E.g., Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365
(1926). After the civil rights era, public officials typically were much too careful to make such statements.
Id. at 316 (advancing a police power rationale to defend a “neutral” zoning ordinance).
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local land use legislation be enacted in the public interest.92 While such language was
obviously quite vague,93 it provided a possible vehicle for new strategies.
Because of the well-known trouble spots in federal litigation strategies, civil
rights advocates looked not only for possible state legal props but also for sympathetic
state courts that would permit direct challenges based on both economic and racial
distinctions. Not surprisingly, New Jersey became the initial center of litigation
challenging the legality of zoning schemes that prioritized light commercial
development and single-family housing. The state’s courts were well known for
adventurous decision making in the civil legal realm.
The factual setting in Mount Laurel Township, in southern New Jersey’s
Burlington County, permitted advocates to structure a new kind of case.94 The
several pockets of poverty in the community were largely populated by Black citizens,
some of whom had roots in the area stretching back to before the Civil War.95
Because of the lack of lower- and moderately-priced housing of decent quality in
Mount Laurel and nearby suburban communities, many minority and low-income
residents had problems finding housing and jobs in the burgeoning suburban area.
Three Black residents of Mount Laurel became the original plaintiffs in a lawsuit
initiated by Camden Legal Services. The NAACP and a developer wishing to
construct moderately-priced housing in the township joined as plaintiffs. Together,
they challenged the Mount Laurel zoning plan on the theory that the township’s
admitted desire to engage in class-based discrimination by excluding lower-cost
housing to avoid low tax ratables was not in the public interest.96 The plaintiffs
sought relief under article I, section 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, which provides:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural
and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness.97

92.

See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 50-8-30 (LEXIS through 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.) (“The
state has an essential public interest in establishing minimum standards for land use in order to protect and
preserve its natural resources, environment, and vital areas.”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 36.70A.010
(LEXIS through 2022 Reg. Sess.).

Id.
93.

The legislature finds that uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together with a lack of
common goals expressing the public’s interest in the conservation and the wise use of
our lands, pose a threat to the environment, sustainable economic development, and the
health, safety, and high quality of life enjoyed by residents of this state.

E.g., N.J. Const. art. IV, § VI, cl. 2.

94. See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
95. See Mount Laurel Doctrine, Fair Share Hous. Ctr., https://fairsharehousing.org/mount-laurel-

doctrine/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (noting that, forgotten in the town’s planned zoning scheme was
“Mount Laurel’s historic [B]lack community, . . . with many tracing their lineage to slaves from the
South who escaped and came north by way of the Underground Railroad”).

96. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 726.
97.

N.J. Const. art. I, cl. 1.
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That section became the vehicle for a critically important challenge to suburban
zoning patterns in the state. The plaintiffs’ challenge became the model for others
brought across the nation.98
B.	The Case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel

Mount Laurel I was a catalyst for a series of similar actions filed against several
New Jersey communities in the 1970s.99 In Mount Laurel I, the N.J. Supreme Court
described the community, one much like hundreds of other suburban areas scattered
across the nation, as follows:
Mount Laurel is a flat, sprawling township, 22 square miles, or about
14,000 acres, in area, on the west central edge of Burington [sic] County. It is
roughly triangular in shape, with its base, approximately eight miles long,
extending in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction roughly parallel with
and a few miles east of the Delaware River. Part of its southerly side abuts
Cherry Hill in Camden County. That section of the township is about seven
miles from the boundary line of the city of Camden and not more than 10
miles from the Benjamin Franklin Bridge crossing the river to Philadelphia.
In 1950, the township had a population of 2817, only 600 more people
than it had in 1940. It was then, as it had been for decades, primarily a rural
agricultural area with no sizeable settlements or commercial or industrial
enterprises. The populace generally lived in individual houses scattered along
country roads. There were several pockets of poverty, with deteriorating or
dilapidated housing (apparently 300 or so units of which remain today in
equally poor condition). After 1950, as in so many other municipalities
similarly situated, residential development and some commerce and industry
began to come in. By 1960 the population had almost doubled to 5249 and by
1970 had more than doubled again to 11,221. These new residents were, of
course, “outsiders” from the nearby central cities and older suburbs or from
more distant places drawn here by reason of employment in the region. The
township is now definitely a part of the outer ring of the South Jersey
metropolitan area, which area we define as those portions of Camden,
Burlington and Gloucester Counties within a semicircle having a radius of 20
miles or so from the heart of Camden city.100

Mount Laurel’s zoning ordinance placed about 70 percent of the township in
residential classifications. About 25 percent of the residentially zoned land was
classified as R-1, which required lots of at least 9,375 square feet, or just under one98. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 238 (N.Y. 1975) (challenging the exclusion

of multifamily residential housing); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1977)
(challenging restrictions that limited one acre lots to single-family dwellings); Britton v. Town of
Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 493 (N.H. 1991) (challenging limits on multifamily housing).

99. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390, 410

(N.J. 1983) (consolidating five cases involving questions under Mount Laurel I).

100. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 718.
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quarter acre. Houses constructed on these lots had to contain at least 1100 square
feet of dwelling space. The R-1 zones were almost completely developed at the time
Mount Laurel I first went to trial.101 Another 70 percent of the residentially zoned
land was placed in the R-3 category, which called for lots of at least twenty thousand
square feet, or just under one-half acre, and houses with at least 1100 square feet.102
The R-3 zones were largely undeveloped and contained most of the substandard
housing in the township.103 The 5 percent residual of land dedicated to residential
uses not zoned as R-1 or R-3 included a few small areas, with slightly different
requirements than the R-1 zone, which were completely developed, and another
small area set aside for a planned adult retirement community. The other 30 percent
of the township’s land area was dedicated to industrial or commercial uses.
Specifically, more than four thousand acres were set aside for light industry—the
sort of high tax producing use many towns craved104 —but only one hundred acres
were actually being used for such purposes at the time Mount Laurel I was first tried.
A surplus of land was zoned for that purpose because of the large number of
communities seeking such lucrative businesses.
Mount Laurel permitted one major exception to this zoning structure: A
“floating” zone, one that could be placed almost anywhere in the township, was
created for planned unit developments (PUD). PUD are often allowed to alter
standard zoning rules to enhance both the density of the overall project and the
amount of open space required to remain.105 This generally increased possible revenue
streams and, in return for that benefit, a developer interested in a PUD project was
required to submit the entire plan to the township for approval. PUD were particularly
adapted to (and preferred for) large sites because of the variable density provisions
and open space requirements. Thus, PUD typically permitted construction of
townhouses provided that other portions of the site were left undeveloped, an
alternative to construction of detached single-family dwellings that was less expensive
and attractive to many people.
Mount Laurel’s PUD process, however, included stringent limitations on
permissible housing structures. Construction of housing units with more than one
101. Id. at 719. The two-part Mount Laurel litigation began in the early 1970s. Id.; Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d

at 409.

102. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 719–23 (finding that the zoning districts were cumulative, so that R-1

contained only R-1; R-2 contained R-1 and R-2; R-3 contained R-1, R-2, and R-3; and so forth).

103. Id. at 718, 724 (discussing unhealthy, overcrowded, and dilapidated living quarters).
104. Id. at 719. Many suburban communities viewed light industrial zones—zones that do not pollute,

produce a great deal of traffic, or create ugly landscapes—as an ideal land use. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of
Plan. Offs., Indus. Zoning Standards Information Report No. 78, at 24 (1955) (listing local
N.J. ordinances that required industrial and exterior lighting to be used “in a manner that produces no
glare on public highways and neighboring property”). When built upon, they produced significant tax
revenues without increasing educational expenses. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723. Children, after all,
do not reside in business establishments. Id. at 721–22.

105. Id. at 720. Density levels were generally figured over the entire project area, but greater flexibility was

permitted in the sorts of structures that could be built. See id.
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bedroom was sharply limited; occupancy of one-bedroom units by school-age
children was barred; occupancy of two-bedroom units was limited to families with
no more than two children; air-conditioning and other amenities were required;
density limitations for the site were strict. In addition, if the development housed
more than an average of 0.3 children per dwelling unit, the developer had to pay
school expenses for all the “excess” children. Four PUD projects had been approved
in Mount Laurel, but all at housing costs well beyond the means of lower- or lowermiddle-class persons.106
The overall structure of Mount Laurel’s zoning scheme was driven by a desire to
maintain an attractive environment while providing community services, especially
schools, at low property tax rates. Because schools were the primary driver of
suburban budgets, land uses that produced significant tax revenue with few children
as occupants were preferred. These uses included “clean,” white-collar business
campuses and large, expensive houses with not many bedrooms. The former produced
abundant taxes and no school children; the latter welcomed well-to-do families with
few students. The N.J. Supreme Court detailed the reasons for such zoning by
Mount Laurel and many other communities as follows:
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the reason for this course of
conduct has been to keep down local taxes on property (Mount Laurel is not a
high tax municipality) and that the policy was carried out without regard for
nonfiscal considerations with respect to people, either within or without its
boundaries. . . .
This policy of land use regulation for a fiscal end derives from New
Jersey’s tax structure, which has imposed on local real estate most of the cost
of municipal and county government and of the primary and secondary
education of the municipality’s children. The latter expense is much the
largest, so, basically, the fewer the school children, the lower the tax rate.
Sizable industrial and commercial ratables are eagerly sought and homes and
the lots on which they are situate are required to be large enough, through
minimum lot sizes and minimum floor areas, to have substantial value in
order to produce greater tax revenues to meet school costs. Large families
who cannot afford to buy large houses and must live in cheaper rental
accommodations are definitely not wanted, so we find drastic bedroom
restrictions for, or complete prohibition of, [multifamily] or other feasible
housing for those of lesser income.

This pattern of land use regulation has been adopted for the same purpose
in developing municipality after developing municipality. Almost every one
acts solely in its own selfish and parochial interest and in effect builds a wall
around itself to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to the

106. Id. at 723 n.8 (“The record is replete with uncontradicted evidence that, factually, low and moderate

income housing cannot be built without some form of contribution, concession or incentive by some
level of government.”).
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tax base,107 despite the location of the municipality or the demand for varied
kinds of housing.108

Despite the hope that reliance on state law theories might reduce some of the
complexities of constitutional and civil rights act litigation, the ensuing state legal
procedures were among the most complex and long lived of any land use dispute in
the nation’s history. This was, in part, because the large number of cases brought in
New Jersey eventually were all consolidated, making for an unwieldy amalgamation
of different zoning statutes and regulatory schemes across an array of communities.109
As noted, when the case first reached the N.J. Supreme Court, Mount Laurel’s
zoning scheme was held to violate the state constitution. The requirement that a
local zoning plan serve the public interest meant that it was required to benefit the
state, not just the enacting community.110
After the decision, Mount Laurel made some relatively minor alterations in its
zoning plan, opening up only a small amount of additional land for multifamily
housing but in locations and with restrictions that made its use difficult.111 The
individual plaintiffs, along with the NAACP, the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE), and Davis Enterprises (a developer) returned to court, and again reached
the state’s high court five years after Mount Laurel I’s debut. Five other cases, each
involving multiple zoning plans in communities across the state, were argued at the
same time.112 The sweep of the litigation was breathtaking:

107. In somewhat earlier litigation, the N.J. Supreme Court found that the general structure of property tax

administration in New Jersey violated the state constitution. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297
(N.J. 1973) (“[I]t may be doubted that the thorough and efficient system of schools required by the 1875
amendment [to the N.J. Constitution] can realistically be met by reliance upon local taxation.”). Inability
of poorer cities to generate revenues in a state then-lacking an income tax meant that funding for schools
varied radically from community to community. Id. at 286. The state was a leader in the property tax
reform movement, much as it was for zoning reform. Id. at 281–82.

108. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723.
109. To tell the full story would require a multi-volume treatise.
110. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 718.
111. This minimal response was not unlike the one that Mount Laurel had given to a non-profit’s building

proposal prior to litigating Mount Laurel I:

The Township Committee responded [to the non-profit’s proposal] with a purportedly
approving resolution, which found a need for ‘moderate’ income housing in the area, but
went on to specify that such housing must be constructed subject to all zoning, planning,
building and other applicable ordinances and codes. This meant single-family detached
dwellings on [twenty thousand] square foot lots. . . . Needless to say, such requirements
killed realistic housing for this group of low[-] and moderate[-]income families.

Id. at 722.

112. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983). Mount Laurel II ruled on zoning ordinances in New

Jersey’s Chester Township, invalidating a low-density ordinance and declining to award a builder’s
remedy; Franklin Township, finding no Mount Laurel I obligation; Clinton Township, reversing the
builder’s remedy awarded by the lower court; Mahwah Township, ordering the town to retry its hand at
low-income housing; and Borough of Carteret, finding no system of exclusionary zoning. Id.
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The October [1980] argument was as much a landmark in the annals of
American legal process as the subsequent decision itself. Because individual
presentations by all the parties would have been hopelessly unwieldy (four
pages were required to list the attorney appearances in the final opinion), the
parties were required by the court to form themselves into interest groups
(towns, developers, and poor people) and only one attorney was permitted to
speak, for the entire group, to any given portion of the twenty-four questions
[under review]. A formal outline of the program, with designated speakers
and time limitations, was presented to each visitor upon arrival, as at the
opera. Under the ground rules announced by the Chief Justice, each speaker
was bound to address the general question, rather than to advocate the facts
or law of his or her clients’ individual position.
The “argument” itself was as extraordinary as its setting. Because virtually
all the lawyers involved were intimately familiar with the actual process of
housing development, their arguments had the feel of testimony at a legislative
hearing, rather than appellate advocacy. The members of the court in turn
slipped readily into the role of legislators, peppering the speakers with wellinformed questions to elicit facts (seldom law) about housing economics and
the mechanics of land development. One of the twenty-four questions, for
instance, asked that the parties discuss the applicability of the “trickle down”
theory of housing supply, hardly a typical subject of courtroom debate.113

After this unusual process, which spanned 18.5 hours of debate over a three-day
period, the N.J. Supreme Court held a single day of “conventional” oral argument,
where attorneys were free to argue their individual clients’ interests. Just over three
years later, the Mount Laurel II decision, heavily edited but used in my class materials,
was rendered in book-length form.114 While reaffirming the basic thrust of the
original decision, the court went to some lengths to clear up the bureaucratic issues
surrounding the case. It reaffirmed the requirement that each zoning authority’s land
use rules must provide for a “fair share” of below-market-rate housing.115 In addition,
the court required each community to adopt changes to both its land use rules and
building code requirements to allow for the construction of “least cost housing”—
multiple family structures, pre-fabricated housing, government supported projects,
mixed-income developments, and other units more affordable than single-family
homes on large lots. While localities were not compelled to subsidize housing
construction, their zoning plans did have to structure their zoning schemes to allow
for this construction. Lower courts were given the responsibility of determining the
appropriate fair shares of the various communities in the state and, as a concomitant
result, the opportunity to narrowly construe the requirement or delay decision making.

113. John M. Payne, From the Courts: Starting Over—Mount Laurel II, 12 Real Est. L.J. 85, 87–88 (1983).
114. The Mount Laurel II decision is more than 150 pages long. 456 A.2d at 196–353.
115. This language may have first been suggested in John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation:

A Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1573 (1993).
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The court also strongly urged the state legislature to establish an oversight agency
to complete the job.116 The Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) was eventually
created,117 but was hamstrung by the refusal of then-Gov. Chris Christie’s
administration to allow the agency to successfully operate.118 The straw that broke
the camel’s back was Christie’s refusal to approve proposed rules about the fair share
of housing each community in the state had to allow under its zoning scheme.
The N.J. Supreme Court found this inaction violative of the state constitution,
and suspended operation of a rule requiring exhaustion of remedies before the
COAH, effectively returning fair share decision making to the state courts.119
While the results of the New Jersey zoning decisions have had a great deal of positive
influence, it is well-recognized that both the cost and legal complexity of such cases
is not much different from disparate impact litigation under civil rights statutes.
Widespread adoption by states across the nation of restraints on traditional suburban
zoning certainly would help by establishing development norms and reducing the
need for litigation like Mount Laurel. But in the absence of such a momentous
movement, most of the suburban world is still much like it was in the 1960s.120
C. New Techniques?

The seminar materials close with a number of newspaper articles and other
sources that present other techniques for coping with race problems in housing. They
are almost entirely devoted to larger scale programs, not to individual cases. The
latter may deal successfully with a single client, building, or even community, but are
unlikely to address the broad, core issues underlying the overarching problem. The
materials include data on affordability, the impact of urban gentrification, and the
availability of below-market-rate housing in various parts of the nation. Potential
solutions are discussed in articles about inclusive zoning programs and the rethinking
of public housing systems. These last two articles are about the well-known inclusive
116. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 212–13 (taking the court’s deference to past legislative initiatives, such

as the Municipal Land Use Law and the State Development Guide Plan, as an indication of its readiness
to do the same for more substantial legislative actions).

117. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-305(a) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
118. Christie was governor of New Jersey from 2010 to 2018. Gov. Christopher Christie, Nat’l Governor’s

Ass’n, https://www.nga.org/governor/christopher-christie/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2022). His resistance to
the Mount Laurel holdings was widely covered in the papers. See Chris Christie’s Fair Housing Problem,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 2015, at A18 (reporting on Governor Christie’s purported attempt to eliminate
affordable housing).

119. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 and 5:97, 74 A.3d 893, 896–97, 911–13 (N.J. 2013) (invalidating the

COAH’s growth share methodology for determining a community’s fair share of affordable housing).

120. But see William H. Frey, Brookings, Melting Pot Cities and Suburbs: Racial and Ethnic

Change in Metro America in the 2000s, at 9 (2011) (“[M]ore than half of [B]lacks in large metro
areas now reside in the suburbs. Their 51 percent suburban share is up from 44 percent in 2000 and 37
percent in 1990.”); David A. Lieb & Acacia Coronado, Census Data Sets Up Redistricting Fight over
Growing Suburbs, AP News (Aug. 13, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/census-2020-house-electionsredistricting-cbad52d72fadac3a5688d6a0036818f4.
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zoning program in Montgomery County, Maryland,121 and an interesting project in
the Hackney Borough of London to redo public housing blocks, or estates as they are
known in England.122
The Maryland material is nicely described in a short article provided by a U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development sponsored publication.123 The
report indicates that more than four hundred communities in the United States,
including Maryland’s Montgomery County, have inclusionary zoning programs of
one kind or another. In brief, these programs require that all housing developments
over a certain size include a certain percentage of below-market-rate units. Most of
the zoning systems are of fairly recent vintage—the product of both litigation and
more open-minded local governments. Typically, the cost of building units for sale or
rent at less-than-market rates124 is offset by granting housing density increases to
developers, thereby creating a larger number of units for disposition in the regular
market than the baseline zoning system typically permits. Montgomery County’s
plan takes the first approach. More than sixteen thousand new affordable units were
constructed between 1976 and 2019.125 A bit more detail is provided by Richard
Rothstein:
Montgomery County . . . requires developers in even the most affluent
communities to set aside a percentage of units (in the case of Montgomery
County, 12 to 15 percent) for moderate-income families. It then goes further:
the public housing authority purchases a third of these set-aside units for
rental to the lowest-income families. The program’s success is evidenced by
the measurably higher achievement of low-income African American children
who live and attend school in the county’s wealthiest suburbs. Montgomery
County’s program should be widely duplicated.126

The article about Hackney Borough, written by Michael Kimmelman, the
renowned art and architecture critic of The New York Times, describes how the
borough left reform plans largely in the hands of housing councils representing those
who live in the estate buildings.127 The estate was in need of significant rehabilitation

121. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Exploring Inclusionary Zoning’s Effect on Affordable Housing, PD&R

Edge [hereinafter Zoning’s Effect on Affordable Housing], https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_
edge_research_012513.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2022); see ordinance cited supra note 60 and
accompanying text.

122. Michael Kimmelman, New York Has a Public Housing Problem. Does London Have an Answer?, N.Y.

Times, Mar. 4, 2019, at C1 (Mar. 1, 2019) [hereinafter N Y Has a Public Housing Problem].

123. See Zoning’s Effect on Affordable Housing, supra note 121.
124. Rental and resale prices, not surprisingly, controlled.
125. See Number of MPDUs Produced Since 1976, Montgomery Cnty., MD, https://www.montgomery

countymd.gov/DHCA/housing/singlefamily/mpdu/produced.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2022).

126. Rothstein, supra note 2, at 206.
127. See N Y Has a Public Housing Problem, supra note 122.
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but lacked money during the Thatcher years.128 With the full cooperation of the
housing council and the leadership of a progressive young mayor,129 plans were
carefully worked out to use empty land owned by the council to build market-rate
housing and use the proceeds to redevelop the public units. Architects well-known
for being able to work with less well-off populations were hired to do the design
work. The results appear workable, well-planned, and attractive.130 Some efforts in
the United States to design workable housing, largely undertaken from the top down
and operating in settings where the residents have little input into the operation of
public housing, have been notoriously unsuccessful.131 The widespread failure of
many public housing projects and destruction of a number of them confirms the
longstanding difficulties in building low-income projects in the United States.132
The materials conclude with a third and final class discussion problem:
Problem 3: Do you think the various solutions outlined in Mount Laurel or in
any of the resource materials provided here will cope in any significant way
with implicit race bias in American housing? If not, do you have other
suggestions for solving the problems? And be sure you think about what the
real problem is beyond our culture’s long-standing bias in housing policy. Is
the goal to distribute persons of color among the general population, to

128. See Biography, Margaret Thatcher Found., https://www.margaretthatcher.org/essential/biography

(last visited Apr. 24, 2022).

129. Philip Glanville has served as mayor of Hackney Borough since 2016. Mayor of Hackney, Hackney,

https://hackney.gov.uk/mayor (last visited Apr. 24, 2022); ‘Riding Roughshod Over Local Democracy’:
Hackney Mayor Picks Apart Whitehall’s Agenda Following Queen’s Speech, Hackney Citizen (May 12,
2021), https://www.hackneycitizen.co.uk/2021/05/12/hackney-mayor-governments-agenda-queensspeech/ (reporting on Hackney’s advocacy for government investment in affordable housing and for
residents to have a voice in redevelopment).

130. See N Y Has a Public Housing Problem, supra note 122. Kimmelman visited two estates in Hackney:

Colville and Kings Crescent. Id. “All in all, the Colville makeover produces more subsidized units
than before, including apartments for middle-income tenants. . . . Every resident of the old
Colville who chose to remain on the estate has been guaranteed a new, better home.” Id. And in
Kings Crescent, “[m]ore than a hundred older apartments are now f itted out with features
residents requested, like winter gardens and balconies. Another 170 will be refurbished soon and
[two hundred] more new apartments built.” Id.

131. See Colin Marshall, Pruitt-Igoe: The Troubled High-Rise That Came to Define Urban America, Guardian

(Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/22/pruitt-igoe-high-rise-urbanamerica-history-cities (discussing an unsuccessful public housing project in St. Louis, overcome by
crime, gangs, drugs, prostitution, murder, faulty plumbing, and raw sewage before its demolition in
1972); see also Ben Austen, The Towers Came Down, and with Them the Promise of Public Housing, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/magazine/the-towers-came-down-andwith-them-the-promise-of-public-housing.html (“Nationwide, 250,000 public-housing units have been
demolished since the 1990s. Atlanta, Baltimore, Columbus, Memphis, New Orleans, Philadelphia,
Tucson—just about every American city got in on the action. But no city knocked down as many as
Chicago.”).

132. It is worth noting that a similar style of reform, though without the use of new housing to subsidize the

old, is now being tried in New York City. See Michael Kimmelman, A Rebirth in the Bronx: Is This How
to Save Public Housing?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2021 at C1 (explaining the benefits of privatizing lowincome housing in the Bronx).
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provide better quality housing for persons of color wherever they live, some
combination of these goals, or something else completely?
V. CONCLUSION

The final problem outlined above has no obvious answer, but it always provokes
interesting and frustrating student comments. While there is widespread approval of
the general ideas described in articles discussing Maryland’s inclusionary zoning and
London’s rehabilitation project, no one really expects either solution to rid the nation
of discrimination in housing markets. It is an area justifiably filled with much
pessimism, especially in the present political milieu in which legislative approval of
spending funds to ameliorate problems of the less well-off is so difficult to enact. But
my hope is that, by the end of the class, participants depart with two basic ideas.
First, in areas where we all know that race discrimination is operating but difficult
to attack directly, indirect approaches are likely to be the most successful. Solutions to
difficult problems are often found not by frontal attacks but by subtle and steady
surprise. These are not solutions typically found by one person working alone. Group
meetings, coalitions of interested groups, and creativity are required. Lawyers often
find it difficult to work with persons different from themselves and outside the legal
world, but that is what is required.133 A course on implicit and non-explicit bias
requires not only careful thinking about discriminatory housing problems, but also
some retraining of the legal profession to seek structural solutions that do not
necessarily rely on traditional litigation remedies typically taught in law school.
Instead, more thought needs to be given to the use of community organizations,
creative organization, legislative pressure, and crafting wholly new solutions.
Second, and perhaps most important, finding solutions to problems of housing
and race discrimination is deeply challenging. Since 1980, the amount of government
funds spent on constructing and maintaining below-market-rate housing has risen
very slowly.134 It is hard to imagine how well-conceived housing programs can be
effectuated without a willingness to spend considerable sums of money.135 In today’s
world, it is difficult to envision a long-term solution for our long-term cultural
unwillingness to spend money on social programs.136 Finding sources of money in a
133. Other classes in the seminar deal more fully with cross-cultural lawyering. For a discussion on cross-

cultural lawyering, see Lynn Su, Unpacking the Teaching Potential of a Hypothetical Criminal Case
Involving a Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification, 66 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 339, 354–56 (2021–2022).

134. Maggie McCarty et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34591, Overview of Federal Housing

Assistance Programs and Policy 36–38 (2019) (totaling just under $25 billion in government
expenditures in 1980 to less than $51 billion in 2018).

135. But see N Y Has a Public Housing Problem, supra note 122 (suggesting that New York City Housing

Authority’s $32 billion budget may be offset by adding market-rate apartments like in Hackney where
well-conceived, workable, and attractive housing was provided despite little funding).

136. The passage in November 2021 of a $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill does, however, suggest that

an end to this unwillingness is near, with projects resulting from that legislation expected to benefit
affordable housing programs, public transportation, and internet access in low-income communities. See
generally Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat. 429; Federal
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society uncomfortable with, if not hostile to,137 spending programs for poor people
requires enormous creativity. Whether the recently enacted programs to dramatically
increase spending on social programs will last and additional funds will be appropriated
is an open question. Perhaps it is a hopeful sign. But given the long-term history of
racial difficulties, solving our housing problems may be a long-haul task.

Spending by Category and Agency, Data Lab, https://datalab.usaspending.gov/americas-finance-guide/
spending/categories/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2022) (accounting for $1.3 trillion under Income Security,
including Unemployment Compensation ($476 billion), Food and Nutrition Assistance ($115.1 billion),
and Housing Assistance ($52.9 billion)). The separately proposed Build Back Better framework would
spend an additional $1.75 trillion on social programs. See Mark Zandi & Bernard Yaros, Moody’s
Analytics, Macroeconomic Consequences of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
& Build Back Better Framework 3 (2021).
137. See Frank Newport, Public Opinion Review: Americans’ Reactions to the Word ‘Socialism,’ Gallup (Mar. 6,

2020), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/287459/public-opinion-review-americansword-socialism.aspx.
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